With Us or Against Us Read online

  (Paris: Rieder, 1931), pp. 107–108.

  46. Ibid., pp. 115–116. Continuing this tradition, Régis Debray describes the

  attitude of a true graeculus of modern times in his pamphlet, L’édit de

  Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour les Etats-Unis d’Occident par Xavier de C***

  (Paris: Fayard, 2002).

  47. A. Dandieu and R. Aron, ibid., p. 243 and 57.

  48. The expression is borrowed from François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion

  (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1998), p. 504.

  49. Le cancer américain, p. 80, quoted in Loubet del Bayle, op. cit., p. 259.

  50. Mounier, Revue de culture générale, October 1930, pp. 14–21, quoted in

  Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente (Paris:

  Seuil, 1969), p. 258. On Mounier and America, see especially Seth Armus,

  “The eternal enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and French anti-

  Americanism,” French Historical Studies, no. 2 (spring 2001), pp. 271–303.

  51. Folder announcing the founding of Esprit, February 1932, reproduced in

  J-L Loubet del Bayle, op. cit., pp. 448–449.

  52. The influence of Heidegger on the editors of Ordre nouveau is well doc-

  umented by J-L Loubet del Bayle, ibid., p. 90. Another probable source

  of inspiration is the essay by Gina Lombroso, La rançon du machinisme

  (Fr. trans.) (Paris: Payot, 1931).

  * * *

  58

  D enis Lacorne

  53. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics [1935] (New Haven:

  Yale University Press, 1974), p. 45. (Based on a lecture delivered in 1935

  at the University of Freiburg. “I have made no change in the content,”

  explained Heidegger in his Preface to the 1953 German edition.)

  54. Ibid., pp. 46, 47, 50, respectively.

  55. Alain de Benoist, quoted in D. Lacorne et al., L’Amérique dans les têtes,

  op. cit., p. 33. Curiously, the same argument was defended by more mod-

  erate politicians, strongly inspired by the Gaullist political tradition, such

  as Michel Jobert, Jacques Thibau, or Jean-Marie Benoist. Other major

  intellectuals like Maurice Merleau Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, or Etienne

  Gilson defended comparable viewpoints at the end of the 1940s. See

  Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956 (Berkeley:

  University of California Press, 1994).

  56. See D. Lacorne, “E Pluribus Unum, a motto for Europe?” Le Débat,

  January 2003, pp. 88–97 and a special issue of Critique Internationale

  on U.S. and European constitution-making (Critique Internationale,

  October 2003, pp. 118–187).

  * * *

  3

  A nti-Americanism in French and

  E uropean Public Opinion

  Gérard Grunberg

  The British–American intervention in Iraq served to reveal the

  depth of European anti-Americanism. The intervention did not create

  anti-Americanism, but it increased it and gave it form. The frequent

  opinion surveys conducted recently can be used to analyze present-

  day anti-Americanism and to explore its varying contours. American

  intervention in Iraq was, for the most part, seen through the prism of

  a previous, already largely negative image of America, which provided

  a framework for interpretation. In a sense, the war in Iraq served to

  confirm in the eyes of many Europeans the manifold reasons they had

  to distrust the United States. This chapter, largely devoted to the

  French case but which will include other European countries as well,

  sets out to analyze the varying contours of anti-Americanism and to

  measure its significance.

  Hostility to the War in Iraq

  On the eve of military intervention in Iraq, at a time when war

  appeared practically certain, hostility to intervention was widespread

  in European public opinion. Roughly, four-fifths of the French were

  against it and remained so to the end of the war, even when coalition

  victory appeared imminent. Four-fifths of the Germans condemned

  the intervention and considered it unjustified. Ninety percent of the

  Spanish—despite the fact that their government had unequivocally

  sided with the United States—declared that they were opposed to the

  war, and this percentage remained high throughout the conflict.

  Three-quarters of Italians considered recourse to war unjustified even

  though in this country, as in Spain, the government backed the

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  60

  G érard Grunberg

  United States. In Poland, where once again the government favored

  intervention, two-thirds of those polled were against their country

  taking part in the war. The same held true for 90 percent of the Swiss

  and 80 percent of the Danish. Ninety percent of the Russians consid-

  ered that the Americans were wrong to intervene without a UN man-

  date. In Great Britain, on the eve of hostilities, 62 percent as against

  22 percent disapproved of the way in which Prime Minister Tony Blair

  was “handling the situation in Iraq”; in February, 29 percent as against

  52 percent were in favor of military intervention. Great Britain is the

  sole European country in which, once the intervention was launched,

  a sense of patriotism and the concern to support the troops in the field

  brought about a shift in public opinion toward increasing support for

  government policy. Tony Blair’s approval rating, which was down to

  31 percent in February, rose to 47 percent in April. In mid-April,

  63 percent of the British as against 23 percent said they approved of

  the military intervention. Everywhere else, public opinion remained

  hostile to the Iraq war up to the end.

  This opposition to the war in Iraq was marked by a serious deteri-

  oration of the image of the United States in European public opinion.

  Thus, between 2002 and 2003, according to a survey conducted by

  the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, the percentage

  of people who had a positive image collapsed in all European coun-

  tries: a drop of 36 percentage points in Germany, Italy, and Spain,

  33 in Russia, 32 in France, 29 in Poland, and 27 in Great Britain.

  Beyond doubt, the Iraq war produced a strong upsurge of anti-

  Americanism in Europe. But, as can be seen from table 3.1, even if it

  was in the years 2002 and 2003 that the image of the United States

  Table 3.1

  Global attitudes toward the United

  States (% favorable)

  1999–2000

  2002

  2003

  Britain

  83

  75

  48

  France

  62

  63

  31

  Germany

  78

  61

  25

  Italy

  76

  70

  34

  Spain

  50

  —

  14

  Poland

  86

  79

  50

  Russia

  37

  61

  28

  Turkey

  52

  30

  12

  Source: March 10/17, 2003, Pew Research Center for

  the People and the Press.

  * * *

  French and Eu
ropean Public Opinion

  61

  deteriorated significantly, the decline had already set in before the Iraq

  issue emerged. Despite 9/11, which produced a real, if short-lived,

  sense of compassion and solidarity for the United States, the changed

  international context and the new orientation of American policy after

  the terrorist attacks in the United States worked against the image of

  America in European eyes. With the exception of Germany and Russia,

  the deterioration of America’s image is the general rule in Europe

  during this period, even if this deterioration was to accelerate during

  the period that followed (table 3.1).We must then try to understand

  what has modified the image of the United States in the course of the

  last few years so as to understand why American policy with regard to

  Iraq has been considered in such negative terms by European public

  opinion.

  The Contours of Anti-Americanism

  The Sole Superpower

  The period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 was a

  time of gestation in international affairs when the old world was

  on the way out while the new world had not yet taken shape. But during

  this period, the image of the United States underwent a gradual change.

  The United States appeared undeniably as the sole superpower. In the

  words of Madeleine Albright, the Pew Center chairperson and secre-

  tary of state under Clinton, when commenting on the results of a

  survey conducted between July and October 2002, anti-American

  attitudes, “simply go with the territory of being the world’s only super-

  power, with unmatched economic and cultural influence. In many

  ways, we are viewed as the rich guy living on the hill. . . . We have seen

  this coming since the end of the Cold War.”

  The extensive survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of

  the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in

  June/July 2002 revealed that the Europeans were not content for the

  United States to remain the sole superpower (see table 3.2). The survey

  report stated, “Europeans appear ready to take on a stronger world

  role. When asked if the United States should remain the only super-

  power or the EU should become a military and economic superpower

  like the United States, 65 percent of European respondents opt for

  the latter. The French (91%) and Italians (76%) are the most supportive

  of this notion, with the Germans (48%) the most cautious. Of those

  desiring the European Union to become a superpower, 9 out of 10

  indicate they support this as a way for Europe to better cooperate with

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  62

  G érard Grunberg

  Table 3.2

  The United States as superpower

  Roles of the U.S. and Europe as superpowers (all responses in %)

  GB

  FR

  GER

  NL

  IT

  PL

  EUROPE

  U.S.

  U.S. should

  20

  3

  22

  11

  7

  12

  14

  52

  remain the only

  superpower

  E.U. should

  56

  91

  48

  59

  76

  63

  65

  33

  become a

  superpower

  like the U.S.

  Source: The German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

  the United States, not compete with it. A majority of these would

  support increased defense spending if necessary to attain this status.”

  During the period of the first Gulf War, 65 percent of the French con-

  sidered that it was a good thing for the United States to play a dominant

  role; in January 2003, only 17 percent thought so.

  The Use of Force

  Mistrust of America as a superpower feeds largely on U.S. readiness to

  use force in international relations, on the increasing preference for

  Hard Power rather than Soft Power, and the open espousal of this

  new approach. The issue of the systematic use of force by the United

  States is increasingly the key element in determining European public

  opinion concerning American policy. More than the specifics of American

  policy, it is the overall tendency to have recourse to force that prompts

  European distrust, not to say hostility. In this regard, the first Gulf

  War appears an isolated exception. From the late 1990s on, a majority

  of the French (57 percent) were against the bombing of Iraq by the

  United States (February 1998). This majority reached 63 percent in

  December of the same year. In March 1999, 46 percent of the French

  condemned NATO bombing of Serbia as against 40 percent who

  approved, even though France was an active partner in the campaign.

  With few exceptions, the Europeans do not apprehend with as

  great an intensity as the Americans the dangers that threaten their

  society, nor do they give them the same degree of importance, and

  they are less inclined to consider that force is the best solution.

  According to the German Marshall Fund survey, 91 percent of

  Americans but only 65 percent of the French considered that interna-

  tional terrorism was a danger that threatened the vital interests of their

  * * *

  French and European Public Opinion

  63

  country. Almost as many Europeans consider that global warming is

  as great a threat as Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction

  (50 and 58 percent), while on the American side the figures are

  46 and 86 percent, respectively.

  In combatting international terrorism, more Europeans than

  Americans think that “helping poor countries develop their economies”

  is the best course (91 percent as against 78 percent); on the other

  hand, more Americans than Europeans favor “air strikes against

  terrorist training camps and other facilities” (87 percent as against

  68 percent).

  The use of troops is considered as legitimate or effective by Europeans

  above all when it is a question of helping people suffering from famine

  or of imposing international law—for the Americans, when the issue is

  the destruction of terrorist training camps. Nevertheless, these differ-

  ences in public opinion were not strongly marked until the question

  of armed intervention in Iraq became a pressing issue. Thus, in June/

  July 2002, a majority of both Europeans and Americans were in favor

  of the invasion of Iraq if the campaign was approved by the UN

  and backed by the allies. When it became evident that America

  would act unilaterally, U.S. and European public opinions increasingly

  diverged.

  The Legitimacy of American Policy

  European opposition to American foreign policy grew as doubts as to

  the legitimacy of the policy intensified. American foreign policy was

  considered as too egotistic, exclusively concerned with the interests of

  the United States. Even though the 9/11 attacks clearly marked the

  United States as target and victim, a majority of Europeans considered

&
nbsp; that American foreign policy had been a contributing factor (GMF

  survey). Sixty-three percent of the French were of this opinion, but

  57 percent of the British as well. In June of 2003, only 59 percent of

  Europeans thought that “in its conduct since the 9/11 attacks, the

  U.S. aims to protect itself from future terrorist attacks rather than

  enforce its will around the globe.” As the Pew Center presentation of

  the March 2002 survey put it: “More generally, criticisms of U.S. for-

  eign policy are almost universal. Overwhelming majorities disapprove

  of President Bush’s foreign policy and the small boost he received in

  the wake of Sept. 11 has disappeared. As a consequence, publics in

  seven of the eight nations surveyed believe that American policies

  have a negative effect on their country. Only the British are divided on

  the impact of American foreign policy on their country.” As for the

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  64

  G érard Grunberg

  survey conducted by the same organization in June/October 2002,

  the accompanying commentary gives a clear picture of the findings:

  “A majority of people in three of those friendly countries—France,

  Russia and Germany—believe the United States is pushing for war to

  win control of Iraqi oil. Majorities totalling 75 percent in France,

  76 percent in Russia, and 54 percent in Germany say that is why

  Washington wants war. Many people around the world believe the

  U.S. does not take into account the interests of their country when

  making international policies. Majorities in most countries also see

  U.S. policies as contributing to the growing gap between rich and

  poor nations and believe the United States does not spend the right

  amount to solve global problems.”

  This perception of America as egotistic explains, in part why

  European reactions to military intervention in Iraq are seen as unjus-

  tified and illegitimate. Figures taken from surveys conducted in

  France demonstrate this clearly. Even if 83 percent of young people

  interviewed by the SOFRES in April agreed that Saddam Hussein was

  a dictator, the party responsible for the conflict was, in their eyes, the

  one that started it, namely the United States. According to IPSOS

  (March 2003), it is the United States (65 percent) and not Iraq

  (12 percent) which is responsible for the outbreak of the conflict.